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Article

Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to
Rebuild the Labor Movement
Ann C. Hodges

†

INTRODUCTION
In 1960, the Supreme Court revolutionized arbitration, at
least in the labor arena, by deciding the Steelworkers Trilogy,
which encouraged arbitration to resolve labor disputes and directed the courts to abstain from involvement in the merits of
1
these disputes. The decisions validated a system of selfgovernment that had evolved in industrial workplaces and affirmed the peaceful resolution of labor disputes internally
2
through the use of arbitration. Labor arbitration is one of the
premier achievements of American labor law.
But now workplace arbitration has taken a different turn.
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court applied a similar deference to
3
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. The cases involved
arbitration agreements between businesses of roughly equal
bargaining power. Businesses, however, seized on the judicial
† Professor of Law, University of Richmond. Professor Hodges is grateful for the valuable research assistance of Casey Ariail, Class of 2014, University of Richmond and Leah Lorenz, Class of 2015, University of Richmond and
for financial support from the University of Richmond. The Article benefitted
greatly from the comments of the participants at the Minnesota Law Review
Symposium on The Future of Labor Law and from discussions with Lynne F.
Siegel, former General Counsel, Oregon Education Association and Illinois
Education Association, Martha Houser, Deputy Executive Director and General Counsel, Colorado Education Association, and Jean R. Sternlight UNLV
Boyd School of Law &Director of the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution.
The conclusions and any errors herein are the author’s. Copyright © 2014 by
Ann C. Hodges.
1. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598–99 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 568–69 (1960).
2. See Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 570 (Brennan, J., concurring).
3. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
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approval of arbitration of statutory claims and began to include
arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion with employees
and consumers. These agreements can have several effects. In
many cases, they deprive the parties of jury trials. They may
limit discovery and available damages, and shorten limitations
periods for filing claims. And perhaps most importantly, they
may limit the ability to bring a class action suit, rendering
many smaller claims uneconomical. This new revolution in arbitration has the potential to limit employees’ ability to vindicate their statutory rights.
With their long history of representing employees in arbitration, unions may have an opportunity to step in and provide
4
representation for employees in these cases. Private attorneys
who represent employees are rarely attracted to individual arbitration cases because of the often-limited potential for dam5
ages. In contrast, union representation in such cases, by either
attorneys or trained union representatives, offers a benefit to
employees that may help unions recruit new members. Additionally, representation in arbitration can be a part of a workers’ rights campaign against employer-imposed arbitration systems that limit the legal rights of employees. Representation
can provide a membership benefit to accompany new forms of
union membership recently announced by the AFL-CIO for em6
ployees who are not in collective bargaining units. Accordingly,
unions should explore cost-effective methods of providing such
benefits to enhance workplace justice for all employees.
4. Other scholars have previously recognized the opportunities for unions to become service providers in the nonunion workplace and build such
representation into majority representation. See Samuel Estreicher, Freedom
of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up the Possibilities for ValueAdded Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 833–34 (1996); Matthew W. Finkin,
Employee Representation Outside the Labor Act: Thoughts on Arbitral Representation, Group Arbitration, and Workplace Committees, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 75, 86–89 (2002); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over:
Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59,
81–83 (1993); Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 169, 205–13 (1991). The program proposed here builds
on that suggested by Professor Finkin. The need for such a program is even
greater today as a result of the limitations on class actions that have developed since his initial proposal, which threaten further the ability of employees
to vindicate their statutory rights.
5. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 206.
6. Michelle Amber, After Trumka Keynote, Convention Votes to Impel All
Workers to Join Labor Movement, 174 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at C-1 (Sept. 9,
2013) (reporting on a resolution to authorize development of new forms of
workplace representation and advocacy outside of collective bargaining units
in collaboration with affiliate unions).
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This Article analyzes the possibility of creating a program
to provide representation to workers bound to arbitrate their
legal disputes with their employers, while at the same time
building a movement to challenge the practice of compulsory
arbitration and its impact on workers’ rights. First, I briefly review the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence and
its impact on workers, with a particular focus on the limitations on class actions. Then I move to a discussion of the advantages and challenges to the creation of such a program. Finally, I examine some alternative visions of what such a
program might look like, highlighting the risks and benefits of
different structures. While there is no doubt that there are
challenges in implementing the proposal, there are also opportunities to build a movement of workers fighting for workplace
justice across workplace boundaries. It is those opportunities
that offer new hope to the labor movement.
I. THE COURT’S ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE AND
ITS IMPACT ON EMPLOYEES
Once the Supreme Court began to enforce agreements to
7
arbitrate statutory claims, the move to enforce workplace arbitration agreements was almost inevitable. Employment cases
comprise a substantial part of the federal docket, and judges of8
ten view such cases with distaste. Arbitration removes the
cases from court and places them in a private system of dispute
resolution, similar to that in the unionized workplace. The difference, of course, is that most employees with such “agree9
ments” have no union representation.
A. THE GROWTH OF ARBITRATION
In 1991, the Court enforced an agreement to arbitrate an
age discrimination claim made in a securities registration application, finding that the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act did not preclude agreements to resolve such claims in a dif7. This occurred in the Mitsubishi Trilogy in the 1980s. See Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481–86 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241–42 (1987); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636–40 (1985).
8. See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage
from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS
L.J. 399, 448–49, 449 n.176 (2000).
9. Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 191 (2003).
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10

ferent forum than the courts. Ten years later, the Court’s tortured reading of the exclusion for employment contracts in the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) opened the floodgates for enforcement of arbitration agreements imposed on employees as a
11
condition of employment. These cases signaled to employers
that they could shift employees’ statutory claims to the arbitral
forum.
Employee plaintiffs and their lawyers have resisted arbitration, resulting in a multitude of cases at all levels of the
state and federal court systems challenging arbitration agreements. Over the objections of employees, some courts have ordered arbitration of legal claims where rights that would be
available in litigation are limited. Arbitration agreements may
be enforced even where discovery is limited, where damages are
limited, where the statute of limitations is shortened, or where
the employee pays part of the cost of arbitration (unless that
12
cost is prohibitive). Where the unilaterally adopted arbitration procedure is too favorable to the employer, however, a
13
court will not order arbitration. Several theories have been
used to challenge these arbitration agreements. Where the underlying statute prohibits arbitration agreements for the statu14
tory claims, courts will not order arbitration. This is also the

10. See Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
11. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001).
12. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91–92 (2000)
(holding that the plaintiff must arbitrate despite the agreement’s silence on
fees since she had the burden of showing prohibitive costs); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298–99 (5th Cir. 2004) (ordering arbitration despite discovery limitations); Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d
1255, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2003) (ordering arbitration despite a provision that
the loser pays the fees of the other party and holding such a provision insufficient to show that arbitration is cost-prohibitive); Great W. Mortg. Corp. v.
Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 231–32 (3d Cir. 1997) (ordering arbitration despite a
shortened statute of limitations and a waiver of punitive damages and holding
that whether the employee waived the longer statute and punitive damages
were questions for the arbitrator).
13. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir.
1999) (“We hold that the promulgation of so many biased rules—especially the
scheme whereby one party to the proceeding so controls the arbitral panel—
breaches the contract entered into by the parties.”).
14. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. Most employment statutes were enacted well
before the Supreme Court authorized arbitration of statutory claims, however,
and do not bar arbitration. Cf., e.g., Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm
(last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (listing several important federal employment statutes enacted prior to the 1980s).
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case when there is no real agreement to arbitrate. Further,
where a statutory claim cannot be effectively vindicated in arbitration, the employee can go to court despite the arbitration
16
agreement. Finally, arbitration agreements are subject to the
same defenses as enforcement of any contract, such as duress
17
and unconscionability.
While some state and federal courts have been vigilant
18
about these defenses, the Supreme Court has whittled away
at them in recent years, casting doubt on their continuing via19
bility. The Supreme Court has played an important role, even
in the state court cases, frequently finding that the FAA
preempts state laws that prevent enforcement of agreements to
20
arbitrate legal claims. The result is growing enforcement of
unilaterally imposed arbitration agreements to prevent employees from litigating statutory claims. The Supreme Court

15. See Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steakhouses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 315–16
(6th Cir. 2000) (finding the agreement to arbitrate was illusory because the
arbitration provider reserved the right to modify all the rules and procedures
without the consent of the employee).
16. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90. The Court’s decision in American Express
v. Italian Colors Restaurant casts some doubt on the scope of this defense to
arbitration by finding that the high cost of individual arbitration relative to
the claim did not create an inability to vindicate statutory rights, and by upholding a class action ban in an arbitration agreement. Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013).
17. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681, 686–87 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1084 (9th Cir.
2007) (invalidating as unconscionable an arbitration agreement imposed in a
contract of adhesion with reduced statutes of limitations, confidentiality provisions, exemptions for employer claims against employees, and a ban on administrative complaints); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6
P.3d 669, 694, 698–99 (Cal. 2000) (refusing to enforce an adhesive contract as
unconscionable because it bound the employee but not the employer to arbitrate claims and it restricted damages).
19. See, e.g., Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309–10 (finding that inability to
vindicate statutory rights because of the high cost of an individual claim relative to a class action does not render a class waiver unenforceable); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–53 (2011) (invalidating a California law finding class waivers in adhesion contracts unconscionable).
20. See, e.g., Nitro–Lift Techs. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503–04 (2012)
(reversing the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court finding noncompetition agreements unenforceable under state law, and finding that the FAA required arbitration of the issue of the validity of the noncompetition covenants);
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349–50 (2008) (“We hold today that, when
parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, state laws
lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum . . . are superseded by the
FAA.”).
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has been particularly active in addressing the impact of arbitration agreements on class actions.
B. FOCUS ON CLASS ACTIONS
Class actions are the legal bane of businesses. They enable
large groups of consumers or employees to band together to sue
the employer in one action. They are particularly useful for
cases where each plaintiff has a small claim that would cost
more to litigate than the claim is worth. Litigating as a group
21
makes it cost-effective to bring the case. Thus, the ability to
bring a class action may increase the business’s vulnerability to
legal claims. Additionally, class actions are costly and time22
consuming to litigate. They often attract media attention and
23
accordingly may affect a company’s reputation. As a result,
there is considerable pressure on companies to settle such
24
claims when they are filed.
Aided by the Supreme Court, businesses have discovered a
new way to eliminate class actions. As the result of a series of
Supreme Court decisions, arbitration now serves that function.
In another trilogy of arbitration cases since 2010, the Court has
held that: (1) class arbitration cannot be ordered where an arbi25
tration agreement does not explicitly provide for it; (2) a California rule that invalidated most class action waivers in arbitration agreements as unconscionable was preempted by the
26
FAA; and (3) a class action waiver is enforceable even if an
individual claim would cost more to litigate than is available in
damages, rejecting the argument that the arbitration agree27
ment denied effective vindication of the statutory claim.
The Court first addressed this issue in 2010 in Stolt–
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., which involved review of a decision by a panel of arbitrators to order
21. Cf., e.g., Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 298 (2d Cir.
2013) (noting the plaintiff’s claim that “pursuing individual arbitration would
be ‘prohibitively expensive’ because the recovery she seeks is dwarfed by the
costs of individual arbitration”).
22. Deborah A. Sudbury et al., Keeping the Monster in the Closet: Avoiding
Employment Class Actions, 26 EMP. REL. L.J., Autumn 2000, at 5, 20–21.
23. Id. at 21.
24. Id. at 6, 22–23.
25. Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684
(2010).
26. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
27. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11
(2013).
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class arbitration where the parties stipulated that the arbitra28
tion agreement was silent on the issue. Finding that the arbitrators’ decision was based only on their own notions of good
public policy, the Court found that arbitrators could not order
class arbitration where the parties had not agreed to it, noting
29
the vast differences between individual and class arbitration.
The following year, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the
Court found that the FAA preempted a California law designed
to protect consumers from class action waivers found uncon30
scionable. The Discover Bank rule held class waivers unconscionable where they are:
found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of
31
money . . . .

Although the FAA allows for the application of generally
applicable contract defenses, the Court found that the law stood
at odds with the accomplishment of the FAA’s purpose of en32
forcing arbitration agreements and therefore was preempted.
“Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes
with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a
33
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”
American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant completed
the formula for eliminating class actions through arbitration
34
agreements. The Second Circuit had ruled that the class action waiver was unenforceable because without a class action,
the plaintiffs could not vindicate their statutory rights given
35
the high cost of expert testimony in this antitrust case. Although the Court had found in previous cases that arbitration
would not be ordered when a plaintiff could not effectively vindicate a statutory right in arbitration, the majority ruled that
this exception did not apply when it was too costly to enforce a
28. 559 U.S. at 668–69.
29. Id. at 670–76.
30. 131 S. Ct. at 1746, 1753.
31. Id. at 1746 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100,
1110 (Cal. 2000)).
32. Id. at 1748.
33. Id.
34. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11
(2013).
35. Id. at 2308.
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right in an individual action because the expense of litigation
36
would exceed the potential recovery.
None of these cases was an employment case, but each was
an interpretation of the FAA, which has been interpreted to
37
cover arbitration agreements in the employment setting. Taken together these cases hold that a class action waiver in an
arbitration agreement is enforceable unless the particular statute states otherwise and that unless the arbitration agreement
expressly provides for class arbitration, no class claim is avail38
able in the arbitral forum.
Given employers’ fear of class actions, these cases seem
likely to spur even more employers to impose arbitration
agreements on employees unilaterally. One development does
offer faint hope for employees. In D.R. Horton, Inc., the NLRB
found that employers who bar class claims in both arbitral and
judicial forums violate the National Labor Relations Act because class actions are concerted activity protected by the stat39
ute. The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement in Horton on ap40
peal, however, and most other courts that have considered the
issue have rejected the application of Horton in actions to en41
force arbitration agreements. And Horton allows employers to
force arbitration so long as a class action is available in arbitra42
tion. It seems likely that arbitration agreements in employment will continue to grow, which could have profound negative

36. Id. at 2310–11.
37. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113–19 (2001).
38. In Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter the Court did enforce an award
where the arbitrator found that the agreement allowed class actions, although
there was no express provision so stating. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,
133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013). That case, however, is based on the broad deference to the arbitrator’s decision. Id. at 2068. If the parties do not agree to allow the arbitrator to decide the issue of availability of class actions, the case
would not apply.
39. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at 6, 13 (Jan. 3, 2012).
40. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344, 364–65 (5th Cir. 2013)
(denying enforcement in relevant part).
41. Three circuits have already rejected the Horton decision. See Richards
v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. 11-17530, at 5 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2013) (per curiam);
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen
v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053–55 (8th Cir. 2013). The author believes that Horton was correctly decided and, in fact, that unilaterally imposed
arbitration agreements in general violate the NLRA as applied to both class
and individual claims. See Hodges, supra note 9, at 237. This is not the trend
in the courts, however.
42. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at 12–13.
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effects on employees limited to the arbitral forum and deprived
of the right to litigate as a class.
C. IMPACT OF ARBITRATION’S GROWTH
For the employer, the arbitral forum offers certain advantages over litigation. It is not public, it is faster and often
cheaper than litigation, and the case is not heard by a jury that
43
may be more sympathetic to an employee than a business. Because the employer often has better access to the evidence
needed to prove an employment case, discovery limitations will
44
make the employee’s case more difficult in the arbitral forum.
If the agreement shortens statutes of limitations or limits damages that would be available in court, those provisions also
45
benefit the employer. There is some evidence that employers,
as repeat players in arbitration, benefit from that status, as
46
compared to employees who are not repeat players. Employers
may be able to secure both better arbitrators and more favora47
ble decisions because of their repeat-player status. And, of
course, the class action limitations are extremely valuable, particularly where the employee’s claims are of low value individ48
ually but large value collectively. Because of the difficulties
created by the arbitral forum and the unavailability of class actions, many plaintiffs’ attorneys decline to represent employees
49
who are limited to arbitration. As a result, legal rights go unenforced and employee protections become mythical.
43. Cf. Green, supra note 8, at 454–62 (explaining employers’ questionable, yet nonetheless extant fears of jury trials and excessive litigation fees).
44. Cf. Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298–99
(5th Cir. 2004) (noting that discovery in arbitration was less extensive than in
litigation, though not finding the limitations sufficiently prohibitive).
45. See Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 231–32 (3d Cir.
1997). Empirical research suggests that employees who win their cases in
court receive greater damages than in arbitration but the studies do not include those cases that settle prior to litigation, which may affect the findings.
Douglas M. Mahony & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Adjudication of Workplace Disputes,
in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 361, 383–85 (Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 2009).
46. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
47. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 45, at 379–80.
48. A prime example would be claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act
or state wage law for overtime pay or work off the clock. See Hodges, supra
note 9, at 215–16.
49. Cf. Rabin, supra note 4, at 220–21 (“Lawyers are trained to be combative, and they often structure their fees on the basis of time spent. What
would make them turn instead to quick, inexpensive and less dramatic forums?”).
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Arbitration is not a panacea for employers, however. Many
employment cases are decided in favor of the employer on
50
summary judgment motions, before a trial is held. Summary
51
judgment may not be available in arbitration, although evi52
dence indicates its use is increasing. Further, the arbitrator
must be paid directly while judges are paid by the taxpayers.
And the ability to appeal arbitration decisions is extremely lim53
ited, which is beneficial for the winner, but not the loser. Also,
because employee lawyers are likely to challenge arbitral
54
agreements, they may result in costly enforcement litigation.
Accordingly, there are some counterincentives for employers
considering implementation of an arbitration agreement.
There is no central repository for data on how many em55
ployers use arbitration agreements. Estimates vary. The class
action decisions from the last several years, however, are likely
to increase consideration of such agreements, particularly by
employers who may see themselves as vulnerable to class
56
claims. As arbitration increases, employees will find it more
difficult to enforce their rights because of inability to find legal
57
representation and enforcement costs. As will be developed in
the next section, unions, using either attorneys or trained union representatives, may help fill the gap.
50. See, e.g., Green, supra note 8, at 451–52.
51. See id. at 470.
52. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited:
What Kind of Employment Arbitration System Has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 72–73 (2014) (finding that motions for summary judgment
were made in 23.9% of 217 arbitration cases studied from the American Arbitration Association in 2008). Defendants received a full or partial grant of
summary judgment in 37 of the 52 cases in which a motion was made. Id. at
19.
53. Green, supra note 8, at 426.
54. Id. at 422.
55. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
405, 408–12 (2007) (reviewing existing studies and stating that “a current estimate in the range of 15 to 25 percent of employers having adopted employment arbitration seems reasonable”). These studies preceded the recent cases
upholding arbitral bans on class actions, which almost certainly increased the
attractiveness of arbitration. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The
Forthcoming Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV.
373, 427 (2005) (suggesting that upholding class action waivers in consumer
and employee arbitration clauses will spur business to increase the use of these clauses and advance the end of class action litigation, absent action to prevent businesses from imposing waivers).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 411.
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II. OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNIONS
While the developments in the courts that allow employers
to divert legal claims to arbitral forums create significant difficulties for employees in enforcing their rights, they may offer
an opportunity for unions to offer representation in arbitration
to build membership. Declines in membership have weakened
union power and reduced the number of employees who see the
58
value in union membership. Many employees have an inflated
59
view of their rights in the nonunion workplace. Educating
employees about their real rights and the difficulties of enforcement of those rights in the absence of union representation
could pay dividends for unions in increasing membership and
power.
Unions, using either attorneys or trained lay union representatives, could provide representation to workers with compulsory arbitration agreements for legal claims in workplaces
without collective bargaining agreements. The representation
could include not only the arbitration proceeding itself, but also
any steps preceding arbitration, such as a grievance procedure
60
or mediation. Such services could be provided as a benefit of
61
at-large membership in the union. This attractive benefit may
help recruit members outside the traditional method of organizing a collective bargaining unit. As some members take advantage of the arbitration representation, others in the same
workplace will see the value of union membership. As membership builds, the union will eventually attain enough members
to seek majority representation rights.
58. See Josh Levis, Analysis: Why America’s Unions Are Losing Power,
CNN (Dec. 12, 2012, 04:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/us/union
-power-analysis.
59. See generally Ian H. Eliasoph, Know Your (Lack of) Rights: Reexamining the Causes and Effects of Phantom Employment Rights, 12 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 197 (2009); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447;
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105
(1997).
60. See Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of American
Labor Unions¸ 69 MO. L. REV. 365, 388, 421 (2004) (suggesting representing
employees in nonunion workplaces in mediation); see also Ann C. Hodges,
Strategies for Combating Sexual Harassment: The Role of Labor Unions, 15
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 183, 226 (2006) (suggesting unions join with other organizations to challenge harassment in the nonunion workplace).
61. At large members would be those who are not a part of an existing collective bargaining unit. The AFL-CIO has indicated an interest in recruiting
at large members. See Amber, supra note 6, at C-1.
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The next section will discuss some of the advantages and
risks to unions of developing a program to provide arbitral assistance to individual employees as a means of developing
membership.
A. ADVANTAGES OF THE MODEL
1. The Need for Representation and Its Potential as a
Recruitment Device
Most employer-created arbitration processes allow employees a representative of their choice, if only to ensure legal en62
forcement and ability to obtain arbitrators. Because of the difficulty of obtaining counsel for arbitration, many employees
with claims will have a need for representation. In general, private attorneys representing employees must take cases that
provide promise for substantial recovery of attorneys’ fees and
63
costs in order to maintain their practices. To do this, they consider several interrelated factors in selecting among potential
clients. These factors include the strength of the claim, the potential for damages, the availability of attorneys’ fees and the
64
right to a jury trial. While very highly paid employees may be
able to afford to pay a lawyer to handle their case, most em62. The Due Process Protocol, developed by representatives of the National Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Employment Lawyers’ Association
and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution set forth the elements
for a fair arbitration procedure, which included employee choice of representatives. See A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory
Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relationship, NAT’L ACAD. ARB. (May
9, 1995), http://www.naarb.org/proceedings/pdfs/1995-298.pdf. The National
Academy of Arbitrators, an organization of professional arbitrators whose
members are chosen using rigorous standards of excellence, advises its members to be cautious in accepting arbitral appointments where one party is unrepresented. See Policy Statement on Employment Arbitration, NAT’L ACAD.
ARB. (May 20, 2009), https://www.naarb.org/due_process.asp. The American
Arbitration Association will decline to administer arbitration if the process
“substantially and materially deviates” from the Due Process Protocol. Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS’N (Nov. 1,
2005), https://www.adr.org/aaa/showproperty?nodeld=/UCM/ADRSTG_
004362&revision=latestreleased; see also CPR Employment Dispute Resolution
Procedure, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., http://www
.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/630/CPR-Employment
-Dispute-Arbitration-Procedure.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (indicating that
CPR reserves the right to refuse to administer any procedure if the employer
and employee do not have the right to choose their own representatives).
63. See Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 33.
64. Id.
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ployees, particularly those who have been terminated, need
representation on a contingency basis so that the fees will come
65
out of the recovery. Additionally, many employment statutes
provide attorneys’ fees and costs to successful plaintiffs as part
66
of the recovery. A strong claim is more likely to result in either a litigation victory or a favorable settlement, which will
lead to compensation for the attorney, either from the defendant or a percentage of the client’s recovery. But if the plaintiff
does not win the case, the attorney gets no compensation.
The size of the potential damage recovery is also a factor as
the attorney risks being insufficiently compensated for the time
invested unless there is a substantial likelihood of a significant
recovery of damages. Unless the facts are egregious, making an
award of significant punitive damages likely and/or a victory
with accompanying attorneys’ fees more certain, lower-wage
employees will have more difficulty finding counsel than high67
er-paid employees because their damages will be smaller. For
the same reason, class actions are preferable to individual
claims because aggregating damages makes the potential for
recovering adequate fees to cover the attorneys’ investment of
68
time more likely. Further, the employer may be more likely to
settle a class action because of the size of the damages, the cost
69
of the litigation, and the potential for bad press. Finally, the
availability of a jury trial is important because conventional
70
wisdom, supported by some data, is that juries are more likely
71
to rule in favor of plaintiffs and to award significant damages.

65. Id. at 14.
66. For a list of some statutes that provide for recovery of fees, see infra
note 188.
67. See Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 31–33 (describing results of a
study of arbitration cases showing that “the economic calculus will make it difficult for plaintiff attorneys to accept cases unless they offer relatively high
damages and strong prospects of winning”).
68. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Players
Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 198–201 (1997).
69. While in theory class claims are less costly for defendants because
they combine multiple claims in one proceeding, the reality is that most class
members would not litigate individual cases so the cost savings are often more
theoretical than real. See Sudbury & Towns, supra note 22, at 20.
70. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 45, at 385; see also Alexander J.S.
Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 1, 8–11 (2011) (finding median damage
awards five to ten times greater in employment litigation than in employment
arbitration).
71. Bingham, supra note 68, at 199.
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Claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage
payment statutes create particular difficulty for plaintiffs. Often the damages for any one individual are relatively small: a
failure to pay overtime, for example, or a requirement that an
employee work off the clock for a few hours a week. Where the
employer makes a practice of these violations, such as by misclassifying employees as exempt when they are not or as independent contractors when they are employees, damages for a
72
73
class may be significant. A collective action provides significant potential for recovery of attorneys’ fees, but an individual
claim in arbitration will be unattractive to most attorneys.
A recent study of employment arbitration found that almost a third of employees in employer-promulgated arbitration
74
procedures represented themselves. Further, even those employees who had a lawyer were far less likely than their em75
ployer to have a lawyer with experience in employment law.
Representation was an important predictor of employee win
rates as well as the amount of damages, which increased sub76
stantially.
Accordingly there is a need for representation in these cases which the union can fill. Public sector unions have recruited
members for many years with the promise of legal representa77
tion in disputes relating to employment. Both teachers’ unions
and police officers’ unions have been successful in maintaining
membership, even in states that do not allow collective bargaining, by offering legal representation as a benefit of member-

72. The FLSA allows employees to collect back pay for two years, three if
the violation is willful. 29 U.S.C. § 225(a) (2012).
73. The FLSA provides for opt-in collective actions rather than class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(2012).
74. Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 15.
75. Id. at 16.
76. Id. at 27–28; see also LAURA J. COOPER, DENNIS R. NOLAN, RICHARD
A. BALES, & STEPHEN F. BEFORT, ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 825 (3d. ed. 2014)
(citing a study showing that the outcome of disputes is similar if both parties
or neither party is represented but where one party has legal representation
and the other does not, the represented party is more likely to win). But see
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment
Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777, 800 n.93, 818 (2003) (finding similar win
rates for low income employees in arbitration with and without counsel).
77. See Joseph E. Slater, The Assault on Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Real Harms and Imaginary Benefits, AM. CONST. SOC. FOR L. & POL’Y 1–2
(2011), http://acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Slater_Collective_Bargaining.pdf.
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78

ship. Teachers sued by students or fired in violation of tenure
79
statutes can obtain legal representation paid by the union.
Similarly, police officers who are disciplined, discharged, or
sued by citizens can obtain legal representation as union mem80
bers. Both of these professions have a significant risk of suits
being filed against them by the members of the public they
serve, which provides a particular inducement for the benefit of
81
union-paid legal representation. However, unions can also educate employees without similar risk, but who may have legal
claims against their employer that they cannot afford to litigate, to recognize the value of the benefit. As discussed in the
following sections, unions that provide such representation can
use it to build membership and thus union strength and to improve the enforcement of workers’ rights, benefiting union and
nonunion workers alike.
2. Using Existing Arbitral Expertise and Balancing Employer
Power
Unions that offer this benefit can use their existing expertise to assist workers in arbitration of legal claims. Most collective bargaining agreements contain arbitration provisions for
contractual violations, and unions regularly arbitrate these
82
claims. Thus union lawyers and union representatives have
78. See, e.g., We’ve Got You Covered, VA. EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.veanea
.org/home/300.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). But see Craig Gilbert, The Politics of Wisconsin’s Declining Union Membership, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Feb. 9, 2013, http://www.jsonline/blogs/news/190545131.html.
79. See, e.g., Higher Education Faculty & Staff: About Us, NAT’L EDUC.
ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/34718.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2014); Your
Benefits: Legal and Financial Services, AM. FED’N TEACHERS, http://www
.aft.org/benefits/legal.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
80. See, e.g., FRATERNAL ORDER POLICE DEFENSE PLAN, http://www
.foplegal.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2014); L.A. POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE,
http://lapd.com/about/services (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
81. See, e.g., Kevin Oates, Professor Defend Thyself: The Failure of Universities to Defend and Indemnify Their Faculty, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1063,
1063–64 (2003) (discussing the increasing number of lawsuits against university professors); W. VA. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, COPING WITH POLICE MISCONDUCT IN WEST VIRGINIA 8 (2004), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr122004024
296.pdf (indicating that police officers in West Virginia must pay any damages
exceeding the state cap); We’ve Got You Covered, VA. EDUC. ASS’N, http://www
.veanea.org/home/300.htm (last visited Apr. 4 2014) (describing the legal benefits of association membership).
82. See COOPER, NOLAN, BALES, & BEFORT note supra 76 at 20 (indicating
that 99% of collective bargaining agreements contain provisions to arbitrate at
least some grievances).
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extensive experience in the arbitral forum. While the employercreated arbitration forum will not be identical to the labor arbitration forum, the experience will still be valuable.
In addition, unions can balance the repeat player effect
83
that benefits employers in legal arbitration. Employers who
have arbitrated previously are more successful in arbitration
and when they have arbitrated before the same arbitrator, they
84
are even more likely to win. Additionally, employees recover
more when the employer is not a repeat player than when it
85
is.
One possible explanation for the repeat player effect is the
experience gained in prior arbitrations while another is that
repeat player employers may screen out meritorious cases, set86
tling them prior to arbitration. Another possibility is that arbitrators maximize their chances of being reemployed by favor87
ing the repeat player in close cases. Finally, employees may
lack knowledge about arbitrator backgrounds or the importance
of arbitrator backgrounds that may influence the decision be88
cause of their lack of experience with arbitration.
Currently, even those employees with representation in
employer-promulgated arbitration have attorneys with em89
ployment law experience far less often than their employers.
Further, employer attorneys are far more likely to be repeat
90
players in arbitration than employee attorneys.
Data on labor arbitration where unions are involved in the
91
process show that employee win rates tend to be higher. While
some of the disparities relate to differences in the forum and
92
the norms that have developed in each, others may be at83. See generally Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration
Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998).
84. Id. at 234, 238; Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 45, at 379–80.
85. Bingham, supra note 83, at 234. This research does not reveal the reason for the repeat player effect but only its existence. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 45, at 380.
86. Bingham, supra note 83, at 234; Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 45, at
380.
87. Bingham, supra note 83, at 242.
88. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 45, at 389–90.
89. Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 16.
90. Id. at 13 (finding in a study of 217 arbitration cases from 2008 that
only 11% of cases involved a repeat player attorney for the employee while
54% of cases involved an employer with a repeat player attorney).
91. Id. at 382–83.
92. Id. at 382, 385–86.
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tributable to the comparative lack of experience of employers
and employees and the fact that only the employer will be in a
position to use the arbitrator in the future. These two factors
that harm employee chances in arbitration can be remedied
through experienced union representation. The union can assist in selecting an appropriate arbitrator, effectively represent
the employee in the hearing and any pre- and post-hearing proceedings, and appear to the arbitrator as a repeat player who
can affect future business. Thus, while arbitration is viewed by
plaintiffs’ attorneys with skepticism, the union may provide
employees a better chance for success in the forum.
3. Demonstration of Value to Build Membership
Representing employees in arbitration provides an opportunity to demonstrate the value of union membership to individuals. As noted above, finding an attorney to enforce rights in
93
arbitration is difficult. Employees with claims will quickly realize that their rights are relatively ephemeral without a viable
means to enforce them. While an employee might be able to arbitrate without representation, represented employees fare bet94
ter in arbitration when the employer also has representation.
While there is always the potential that an employee who loses
in arbitration will blame the union, an effective advocate will
educate the employee about the risks of loss and demonstrate
the value of representation, win or lose.
Representation offers an immediate and tangible value to
95
the employee that is also visible to other employees. The union can use the opportunity provided by representation to inform the employee(s) of other benefits of union membership and
representation such as a union-sponsored training, collective
bargaining agreements, just cause protection against discharge,
96
and union representation on the job site. Arbitration prepara93. See supra notes 62–73 and accompanying text.
94. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The NLRA’s Legacy: Collective or Individual Dispute Resolution or Not?, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 249, 261 n.67
(2011).
95. One difficulty with this strategy is that many of the cases may involve
employees who have been terminated, limiting their continued contact with
their coworkers. See Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 13 (showing only 5% of
217 American Arbitration Association cases in 2008 involved employees who
were still employed). It is possible, however, that the availability of union representation in arbitration may encourage more employees to bring claims
while still employed. See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., The Union Advantages: Facts & Figures, SERVICE EMPS.
INT’L UNION, http://www.seiu.org/a/ourunion/research/union-advantage-facts
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tion done at a union facility presents a chance for the client to
make connections with other union members and union staff
and learn more about the union. Motivated employees who
demonstrate leadership potential could be trained to organize
and educate other workers at the workplace or in the particular
industry about the union and the benefits of representation, including the opportunity to obtain representation for legal
claims. Indeed, if particularly skilled individuals are identified,
they might even be trained to represent employees from their
97
workplace in arbitration of similar claims.
Wage and hour claims, where many employees are treated
similarly in pay denials, might be particularly susceptible to
this sort of treatment. Once one or two claims are litigated in
arbitration, a litigation formula is established that should work
for similar claims without the need for a trained lawyer to handle the case. In fact, after some number of successful arbitrations, it is likely that the cases will settle quickly and the benefits of the union will be tangibly demonstrated to all employees.
4. Ensuring Enforcement of the Law
Helping workers enforce rights violated by their nonunion
employers raises the floor for all workers, including union
workers. Research has demonstrated that employees in union98
ized workplaces are more likely to enforce their rights. Com-and-figures.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (describing the spectrum of benefits
for union members).
97. But see infra notes 130–40, 184–88 and accompanying text regarding
representation by non-lawyers.
98. See John W. Budd & Brian P. McCall, The Effect of Union on the Receipt of Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 478,
488 (1997) (finding that unionized employees are more likely than nonunion
employees to collect unemployment compensation benefits, even after controlling for differences in demographics, unemployment compensation systems,
and jobs); Barry T. Hirsch, David A. MacPherson & J. Michael Dumond,
Workers’ Compensation Recipiency in Union and Nonunion Workplaces, 50
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 213, 218, 233 (1997) (finding that unionized workers
were more likely to file workers’ compensation claims and more likely to receive workers’ compensation benefits); Michele Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth,
Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 77
(1986) (finding correlation between union activism and filing of lawsuits);
Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, Who Files Suits and Why: An
Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 134–36
(finding that both union activism and grievance filing were positively associated with filing of lawsuits and discrimination charges); Alison D. Morantz, Does
Unionization Strengthen Regulatory Enforcement? An Empirical Study of the
Mine Safety and Health Administration, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 697,
712–13 (2011) (finding MSHA inspections in unionized mines are more fre-
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pliance with legal requirements raises costs for employers.
Nonunion employers who ignore the law can make it difficult
for unionized and compliant employers to compete. Accordingly,
just as it is in the interest of unions to raise wages of nonunion
employers to avoid the race to the bottom, it is in their interest
to force all employers to comply with the law.
To the extent that greater enforcement of law by union
members is due to the lack of fear of retaliation because of the
99
protection of a union contract, offering representation to
workers who have no contract will not increase enforcement.
Another part of the explanation, however, is the union’s education of workers about their rights and representational support
100
in enforcing them.
Thus, education and representation of
workers in unorganized workplaces will result in greater enforcement of the laws and benefit those in unionized workplaces as well. Unionized workers will benefit because their employers will not be threatened by nonunion competitors who
can offer lower prices based on avoidance of legal compliance.
Reducing the difference in cost structure between union and
nonunion employers will make it easier for the union to negotiate better employment terms for unionized workers.
Having reviewed some of the benefits of the proposed representational model, I now turn to the concerns and risks that
unions must consider before implementing this proposal.
B. MINIMIZING RISKS FOR THE UNION
Implementing a program to provide representation in arbitration to employees in unorganized workplaces is not without
risk. The program must be carefully developed and implemented as part of an effort to increase union membership and legal
enforcement to benefit all members of the union. The sections
quent, last longer, and result in higher proposed fines); David Weil, Enforcing
OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 20, 26–34 (1991) (finding
that unions increase enforcement of OSHA in the manufacturing sector, resulting in more frequent inspections, more employee representation on inspections, more intense inspections, greater numbers of violations found and
greater penalties); David Weil, Employee Rights, Unions, and the Implementation of Labor Policies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL INDUS.
REL. RES. ASS’N MEETING 474, 476 (1993) (analyzing various studies and concluding that unions improve enforcement of various laws, including the Fair
Labor Standards Act, OSHA, MSHA, certain provisions of ERISA, workers’
compensation laws and unemployment compensation laws).
99. See Budd & McCall, supra note 98, at 490–91.
100. Id.
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below analyze several significant issues that must be considered in program design and implementation.
1. Remaining a Movement and Not Just a Service Provider
Using legal action as a primary strategy for developing and
maintaining a social movement risks losing the very individu101
als that the union is trying to recruit. Because legal action
requires a level of expertise that the average worker does not
possess, an organization trying to use litigation (or arbitration)
to build worker membership may instead cause workers to feel
102
disempowered and disconnected. Thus, the process must be
carefully constructed to involve the employees and to engage
them in the broader organization, not just their own arbitration. Otherwise, once the arbitration is over, the employee will
103
have no lasting connection to the organization.
It is important that the union remain a movement, not a service or104
ganization for its members.
105
Worker centers, which often provide legal representation
for low wage workers, have struggled with this question of balancing the use of organizing and legal action to effectuate social
106
change, while increasing and retaining membership. Lessons

101. See Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 604, 604
(2009); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 455–56 (2001) (summarizing critiques);
Victor Narro, Finding the Synergy Between Law and Organizing: Experiences
from the Streets of Los Angeles, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 339, 353–54 (2008).
102. See JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS 323–24
(2010) (arguing that unions have placed too much value on professionalism
which results in a gulf between the leadership and the rank and file); COREY
S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, LOW-INCOME
CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 23 (2009) (identifying problems
with the necessary use of legal expertise to initiate change which may result
in lawyers dominating the process).
103. JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS 300–02 (2005) (describing challenge of using individual representation to generate collective action
and suggesting ways to facilitate the process).
104. Nicole A. Archer et al., The Garment Worker Center and the “Forever
21” Campaign, in WORKING FOR JUSTICE: THE LA MODEL OF ORGANIZING AND
ADVOCACY 154, 162 (Ruth Milkman et al. eds., 2009).
105. “Worker centers are community-based mediating institutions that
provide support to low wage workers.” JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM 2 (2006). They focus on
three prongs of action: service, advocacy and organizing. Id.
106. Archer et al., supra note 104 at 160–64 (describing the Garment
Worker Center’s struggle to maintain involved membership in a campaign
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learned from these groups include the importance of clear
communication between workers and legal advocates, involvement of employees in decisions of the organization, and devel107
opment of leadership among the employees. Jennifer Gordon,
who founded a worker center, describes the use of law not only
to vindicate specific legal rights but also to challenge the system and foster collective activity through legislative action,
108
protest, alliance building, and publicity. For example, a group
of workers represented by the union might use multiple individual claims in arbitration to impose a cost on the employer
109
who has deprived the employees of the class action option.
Regardless of victory in individual actions, the workers may
build solidarity around the goal of regaining their right to collective litigation of claims. Workers may also be motivated to
support changes in the law relating to arbitration to allow not
only workplace, but also consumer class actions. Using arbitration as part of a movement to increase workers’ rights broadens
the goal beyond just winning a particular arbitration. Having
broader goals reduces the risk that workers will abandon the
union once the arbitration is over.
Another advantage of making arbitration representation
part of a broader campaign for workers’ rights is that it reduces
the adverse consequences of losing a case. Employee win rates
in employment arbitration are not high, especially when the
individual arbitration agreements of high-powered executives
110
are excluded from the data. While union representation may
increase the win rate, there will still be lost cases, perhaps
many. If the goal is not just winning a case, but imposing a cost
on the employer and educating workers and the public about
the loss of rights through unilaterally-imposed arbitration, employees are less likely to blame their representatives if a case is
lost. The employees can then be motivated to educate their
coworkers about the problems with the arbitration procedure

that focused on legal action); GORDON, supra note 103, at 300; Narro, supra
note 101, at 342–43.
107. GORDON, supra note 103, at 291–94 (describing the importance of a
culture of democracy); Archer, supra note 104, at 162–63; Narro, supra note
101, at 358.
108. GORDON, supra note 103, at 295–98.
109. Id. at 296 (suggesting the use of large numbers of individual claims to
clog a legal system and show the need for change).
110. See Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 22.
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that may have affected their ability to win the case. Employees can also help the union compile data to support legislative
efforts to restrict unilaterally-imposed, unbalanced arbitration
procedures. Whether the goal be eliminating compulsory arbitration or requiring fair and balanced arbitration procedures,
their stories can become a part of efforts to advocate for change.
In this way, the union’s representation is used to build and sustain a movement.
Finally, both educating and listening to workers are essential if representation in arbitration is to translate to active union membership. If the union is nothing more than a legal service provider to the member, then the program will be nothing
more than a lost opportunity for the union.
2. NLRA Limitations on Moving to Majority Representation
Because a major goal of the arbitration program is building
membership, where possible, unions will want to increase
membership in each workplace to become the majority representative for the employees. At-large members will have whatever benefits the particular union chooses to provide but cannot, at least under current law, compel the employer to
negotiate with the union. Only when a majority of employees in
an appropriate bargaining unit choose representation will the
bargaining requirement attach, enabling the union to negotiate
a collective bargaining agreement to protect the workers. Unions interested in moving from one or more at-large members to
majority representation must be aware that providing free representation during the critical period between a petition for
representation and an election may be grounds for setting aside
112
an election won by the union. While the National Labor Relations Board had previously held that providing employees free
legal services relating to employment concerns was not objec113
114
tionable, after a contrary opinion by the D.C. Circuit, the
Board in 2011 in Stericycle decided that “a union ordinarily engages in objectionable conduct warranting a second election by
financing a lawsuit filed during the critical period, which states
claims under Federal or State wage and hours laws or other
similar employment law claims on behalf of employees in the
111. To the extent that the employees are no longer in the workplace, this
task may be complicated. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
112. See Stericycle, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (Aug. 23, 2011).
113. See Novotel New York, 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 637 (1996).
114. See Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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115

unit.” The rule was qualified, however, in a footnote, stating
that where legal assistance was an existing benefit of union
membership, not conditioned on joining the union before the
election, providing such assistance only to members was not ob116
jectionable.
The Stericycle rule does not provide a serious obstacle to
the legal assistance benefit so long as it is provided to all union
members regardless of the election. While none of the cases involved the precise program advocated here, a benefit tied to
membership that is available to employees who choose to join
the union even without a majority organizing campaign would
seem to pass muster under the existing rules, as it would be
available to all members regardless of when they joined the union. To add extra insurance that the benefit would not invalidate a pending election, the union could avoid filing any claim
during the critical period, since the Board drew a bright line
rule that permits legal representation in claims filed before the
petition but finds objectionable claims filed during the critical
117
period. Because the median time between filing the petition
118
and the election is thirty-eight days, avoiding filing during
this time period would not pose a significant problem in most
situations. Thus this program should not interfere with union
efforts to convert at-large members to majority representation
where support exists.
3. Duty of Fair Representation or Other Potential Liability
An important question in determining whether to institute
such a program is whether the risks for liability for the union
outweigh any benefits from increased representation. In providing representation in arbitration outside collective bargaining,
the union’s intent will be to offer the best possible representation. Anything less will not serve the interests of either the union or the workers. Nevertheless, some cases will be lost, some
workers will be unhappy, and some may bring legal action
115. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 61, at 4.
116. Id. at 4 n.15 (citing Dart Container, 277 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1985) (holding
that leaflet telling employees that the membership benefit of free legal services from the union would be available to employees in the event the union
won the election was not objectionable because it merely advised employees of
an existing union benefit)).
117. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 61, at 3–4.
118. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
(FISCAL YEAR 2012), MEMORANDUM GC 13-01 at 5 (2013), available at http://
www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/general-counsel-memos.
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against the union. While setting realistic expectations regarding the outcome of arbitration will help deal with this problem,
it is important to consider what legal claims might be available
to dissatisfied workers.
When representing workers in arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements, unions are governed by the duty of fair
representation. The union’s representation cannot be arbitrary,
discriminatory or in bad faith or the union will be liable to the
119
employee for any losses attributable to the union’s conduct.
The duty of fair representation, however, arises from the right
120
of exclusive representation. It is necessary to ensure the constitutionality of the law, which deprives the employee of the
right to negotiate directly with the employer and substitutes
121
representation by the union. Thus, the purpose of the duty
does not require its application when the union is offering representation to employees who may choose instead to represent
themselves because they are not a part of a majority bargaining
unit. Representation is a benefit of union membership, but acceptance is not an obligation. The employee remains free, in the
case of legal claims, to choose alternative representation. Indeed, the same is true of legal claims even where the union is
the majority representative unless the union has negotiated an
exclusive forum for legal claims that bars the employee from
122
choosing alternative representation.

119. See Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 223 (1983); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 195–96 (1967).
120. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Freeman v. Local Union No. 135, Chauffeurs, Teamsters &
Helpers, 746 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding no duty of fair representation requiring appeal of unfavorable grievance arbitration award because
the “union does not serve as the exclusive agent for the members of the bargaining unit with respect to [that] particular matter”); Dycus v. NLRB, 615
F.2d 820, 826 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming NLRB’s finding that the duty does
not apply to union’s withdrawal as representative since duty terminates with
representation); Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div., 641 F. Supp. 1024, 1028–31
(N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding union owed no duty
to former employees in settling wage claims with employer where they were no
longer members of the bargaining unit and their interests conflicted with
those of current employees); Lacy v. Local 287, UAW, 102 L.R.R.M. 2847, 2850
(S.D. Ind. 1979) (finding union owed plaintiffs no duty with respect to filing
claim for Trade Readjustment Assistance benefits), aff’d mem., 624 F.2d 1106
(7th Cir. 1980); cf. Roberts v. W. Airlines, 425 F. Supp. 416, 430–31 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (finding union had no legal duty to file lawsuit challenging state laws
limiting employment of women); Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219,
1229 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (same), aff’d, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
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Based on existing precedent and the rationale for the application of the duty, it seems unlikely that the duty of fair representation would apply to unions representing employees in
arbitration where the employee remained free to choose other
representation. Because none of the existing case law arose in
an identical context, however, the answer is not certain. Most
of the decided cases arose when the union failed to file legal
claims, and many involve efforts by employees to evade the
123
statute of limitations based on the union’s failure to file.
Courts declined to find any duty on the part of the union to file
a claim, absent any explicit promise to do so, when the employee was free to file his or her own claim. But in the program
proposed here, where the union has voluntarily taken on representation of the member in a legal case, some duty to the member may apply.
If attorneys are used, ethical standards regarding representation will apply, and malpractice claims will lie against the
lawyers who fail in their duty. If union representatives are
124
used, the duty of fair representation might be the most favorable standard for the union as it applies a relatively high bar
for claims and provides the union a wide range of reasonable125
ness in its decisions. The wide range of reasonableness, however, is designed to provide the union the flexibility needed to
represent all workers in the exclusive representation context.
Representing an individual in a legal claim, particularly where
there is no majority representation, does not implicate those
concerns, with one possible exception. The union which represents the entire bargaining unit must make decisions about
wise use of resources and may choose not to arbitrate certain
126
contractual claims because of resource limitations. The same
concerns may apply to at-large union members.

123. See, e.g., Steffens v. Bhd. of Ry. & Airline Clerks, 797 F.2d 442, 447
(7th Cir. 1986); Freeman, 746 F.2d at 1316; Lacy, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2847.
124. The use of union representatives in these cases raises other issues discussed infra notes 184–88 and accompanying text.
125. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 69, 76–78 (1991).
Generally employees have failed in their efforts to hold lay union representatives to the standard of attorneys in handling cases in the contractual grievance and arbitration procedure. See Ellyn Moscowitz & Victor J. Van Bourg,
Carve-Outs and the Privatization of Workers’ Compensation in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 52 (1995) (discussing cases).
126. There is some debate about whether this is a legitimate reason for declining to arbitrate under a collective bargaining agreement. See generally
Clyde W. Summers, The Individual Employee’s Rights Under the Collective
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Once the union commits to representation as a benefit of
membership, however, it would seem committed to providing
such representation on the terms offered. Failure to do so
might well give rise to a legal claim against the union, perhaps
in the form of breach of contract. In addition, negligent representation by a union representative might also give rise to a
127
common law claim of breach of a duty. While the union might
argue that such a claim is preempted by the duty of fair repre128
sentation, it is unclear whether the duty would have such
force in the absence of exclusive representation. In either case,
there is some risk of liability for unions instituting such a program. While attorneys can protect against suits for malpractice
with insurance, unions should consider the potential for liability in using union representatives as a cost of the model. There
is no reason that the risk of claims against the union would be
any greater than the risk of duty of fair representation claims
in the exclusive representation context, however. And finding a
lawyer to sue the union would be even more challenging than
finding a lawyer for arbitration in the first place. Thus, the risk
should be factored into the cost, but should not dissuade unions
from developing the program. Financing considerations will be
contemplated further in Part IV.
4. Unauthorized Practice of Law
While unions commonly use union representatives in contractual arbitration without consideration of the unauthorized
practice of law, even where such claims might implicate or
129
overlap with legal claims, the growth of arbitration of legal
Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251
(1977).
127. Some courts have addressed the issue of what standard of care applies
to provision of what might be characterized as legal services by non-lawyers.
See Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of Care for the Unlicensed Practice of Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 87, 97. The
issue of the standard is intertwined with the question of what is the practice of
law. Id. In some cases the courts find non-lawyers should be held to the standard of a lawyer. Id. Another approach is to apply a general negligence standard without explicitly defining the standard of care. Id. at 97–98. Other cases
have declined to apply an attorney standard where a lay person is authorized
to engage in representation in a legal forum. Id. at 99–100.
128. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
129. In 2012, the Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to prevent nonlawyer union representatives from representing the union in contractual labor
arbitration based on the prohibition on unauthorized practice of law. See In re
Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d 85, 86 (R.I. 2012). The court noted that some
other states had explicitly allowed the practice, most had not addressed the
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claims has given rise to concerns about unauthorized practice
130
of law in the arbitral forum. While an employer’s program of
arbitration may not limit representation to lawyers, this does
not prevent the bar from intervening to protect consumers from
unauthorized legal practice. The bar may be more concerned if
the arbitration is being undertaken for compensation in the
form of dues, as the program contemplates, as contrasted with
representation by a friend, family member or coworker. Further, an employer who fears that union representation in arbitration may lead to unionization of the workforce may be motivated to report such representation to the bar. If the duty of
fair representation does not apply to protect the union member
131
from union misconduct, the bar may be even more concerned
about protecting members from unauthorized practice of law.
There is no easy answer to the question of when unauthorized practice of law occurs in arbitration. The issue could arise
whether union representatives or out-of-state lawyers are involved. The cases that would be covered by the proposed program will largely involve legal claims. That they take place in
the arbitral forum does not automatically place them outside
the practice of law. Such determinations depend on the law of
the state. One question will be whether the state has authorized representation by either nonlawyers or out-of-state law132
yers in arbitration. That in turn may depend on which state’s
133
law applies. Some arbitrations may take place in a location
other than where the dispute arose, and much of the prepara134
tion may take place in yet other jurisdictions. In some states,
out-of-state attorneys may be able to do a few arbitrations per
year without engaging in unauthorized practice or may be able
to obtain admission pro hac vice for purposes of a particular
135
case.
issue, and none that the court or the parties could find had prohibited union
representatives from arbitrating contractual claims. Id. at 90–91.
130. Kristen M. Blankley et al., Multijurisdictional ADR Practice: Lessons
for Litigators, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 29, 29–31 (2009); Buhai, supra
note 127, at 125–26.
131. See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text.
132. Blankley, supra note 130, at 32–33; Buhai, supra note 127, at 125–26.
133. Id. at 38–43.
134. Id. Workplace arbitrations are probably less likely to be scheduled in
locations other than the employment site than others, as choosing an inconvenient location may jeopardize the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.
135. Blankley, supra note 130, at 43–54 (discussing a variety of state rules
and their applicability).
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Another question will be whether the arbitration actually
136
involves the practice of law at all. If not, unauthorized practice is not an issue. The answer will depend in part upon the
design of the arbitration system and the state law that ap137
plies. Many of the arbitration systems for nonunion employees have been structured to contain at least some of the elements of a judicial proceeding in order to avoid being set aside
by a court on grounds that the agreement is unconscionable or
the employee is unable to vindicate the statutory rights in the
138
proceeding. These elements may make it more likely that an
arbitration is construed as the practice of law.
In the many jurisdictions that have adopted ABA Model
Rule 5.5(c)(3), the questions are easier to answer for attorneys;
the rule authorizes licensed attorneys to practice law temporarily in an ADR proceeding if their representation in the case is
“reasonably related” to their practice in the jurisdiction where
139
they are licensed. For non-attorneys, however, or attorneys in
other jurisdictions, the questions are more complex and require
a careful evaluation of state law.
These issues relating to unauthorized practice of law complicate the creation of an arbitration program for legal claims,
but provide ammunition for an advocacy campaign against the
use of arbitration to deprive employees of their legal rights.
Employees can be compelled by their employer to arbitrate le136. Id. at 31–37; Buhai, supra note 127, at 94.
137. Blankley, supra note 130, at 33–36 (discussing varying views on
whether and when arbitration is the practice of law). While some states have
not construed arbitration as the practice of law under the unauthorized practice of law limitations, these cases have involved attorneys not authorized to
practice in the jurisdiction and not non-attorneys. See, e.g., Colmar, Ltd. v.
Fremantlemedia N. Am., Inc., 801 N.E.2d 1017, 1028 (2003) (recognizing that
arbitration is more informal than a judicial proceeding, is chosen for the informality which leads to quicker and cheaper resolution of disputes, is not required to follow the rules of evidence, and does not rely on legal precedent; refusing to set aside an award because of the participation of an attorney not
licensed in Illinois); Prudential Equity Grp. LLC v. Ajamie, 538 F. Supp. 2d
605, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same).
138. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (finding on due process grounds that a predispute arbitration agreement
is enforceable only when it provides for neutral arbitrators, more than minimal discovery, a written award, all types of relief available in court, and does
not force the employee to pay unreasonable costs or arbitrators’ fees);
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682 (Cal.
2000) (reaching the same result on unconscionability grounds).
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(3) (2013). Twentynine states have adopted this provision although six have modified the rule in
ways that may alter its application. Blankley, supra note 130, at 47.
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gal claims in a less hospitable forum, deprived of the ability to
bring such claims as a class, and then deprived of representation because attorneys are uninterested or unaffordable and
non-attorneys are ineligible due to bar rules. The reason that
non-lawyers have been permitted to practice law in some areas
is a tacit recognition that poor and middle-class Americans
140
have been deprived of access to legal services due to cost. Efforts to restrict union representation of workers in arbitration
can become part of the campaign to combat unilaterallyimposed arbitration and provide a fair and neutral forum for
workplace disputes.
These issues relating to the unauthorized practice of law
must be taken into account in determining the financing of the
system and the model to be chosen, and it is to those two subjects that the Article turns next.
III. STRUCTURING AN EFFECTIVE AND SUSTAINABLE
PROGRAM
A. FINANCING THE PROGRAM
Perhaps the most difficult issue is how to finance such a
program. Representation can be costly and the demand is
somewhat unpredictable. The program would backfire as a tool
for increasing union membership if the need for representation
outstripped the ability to provide it effectively. Thus the program must be structured in a way that makes financing feasible. While the program might vary based on the particular union, this section will set forth some programmatic options
141
relating to finances. The following section, which discusses
how to provide the representation, will also affect the financial
viability of the program.

140. Buhai, supra note 127, at 93–94. Although some representation is
permitted but not expressly authorized, the Social Security Act explicitly allows non-attorney representation in claims before the agency and provides for
compensation. 42 U.S.C. § 406 (2006).
141. Some scholars have suggested that new ways of aggregating claims in
arbitration might arise and that there might even be a market for lawyers or
non-lawyers to purchase small claims. See Myriam E. Gilles & Anthony J.
Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class Action Era,
DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 392, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2263443. Unions might
play a role in creating new ways of financing and litigating arbitration claims
of employees.
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1. Eligibility for Assistance
Since a major purpose of the program is to increase union
membership, the benefit should be offered to union members
only. Unions should consider whether to require a waiting period after joining for eligibility for representation. A waiting period would prevent individuals from joining only when they
need representation and thus increasing costs. If most members need representation, there will an insufficient number of
members who do not use the benefit to subsidize the cost of
representation. On the other hand, the recruiting appeal for
representation may be less attractive to those who cannot foresee using the benefit. And long delays in seeing benefits from
the program may cause employees to cease membership. It will
be important to publicize victorious cases to members and potential members so that they see the value of obtaining and retaining membership.
2. Scope of Assistance
The program will also need to define the scope of legal assistance available. The union needs to create a program with
the correct balance to ensure that costs to the union are not excessive while still providing a valuable service to members. To
some extent, the scope of representation will depend on anticipated utilization and the model of representation chosen. The
proposed model is to offer representation in arbitration, including any procedures preceding arbitration. An alternative would
be to offer representation in any legal dispute relating to employment regardless of forum.
Limiting the program to arbitration reduces the population
of employees who can be effectively recruited using this benefit.
The arbitration-only option would apply primarily to newly recruited at-large members, as most existing members will not
have an arbitration program for claims other than those under
the collective bargaining agreement, unless the union has chosen to negotiate such a program. This would reduce the cost of
the program. A program offering representation for all workplace legal claims regardless of forum will be substantially
more expensive as existing members would likely take ad142
vantage of the option as well. Additionally, the union must
142. Of course, some unions already provide representation for members in
cases involving claims under laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the various discrimination laws. Another option is to offer a broader legal services plan that also covers common claims not directly related to employment
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have attorneys available for cases litigated in the judicial fo143
rum. Alternatively, the program could cover all arbitration,
including consumer arbitration, which would expand the benefit in ways that would aid existing members, but would also
challenge existing union expertise.
An arbitration-only program has the advantage of being
part of a larger political and social justice campaign to fight
back against employers who are limiting employee and consumer rights using binding arbitration agreements. Such a
campaign would align unions with plaintiffs’ employment attorneys and other groups, such as Public Citizen, who are
144
fighting the arbitration battle. As noted above, it also broadens the goals of the program beyond winning a particular case,
which increases the utility of the program as an effective recruitment and retention device.
Limiting representation to arbitration will likely be cheaper for the union because it is likely to involve only one hearing
with very limited availability of any appeal. Moreover, the
speed of the process will avoid tying up the representatives for
long periods of time. If the employer’s ADR program includes
such as real estate closings, divorces, and immigration issues. Some unions
have a history of offering such plans. See, e.g., Affordable Access to Justice,
UAW LEGAL SERVS. PLAN, http://www.uawlsp.com/default.asp (last visited
Apr. 4, 2014). Unions have more general plans as well. See Legal Help for Union Families, UNION PLUS, http://www.unionplus.org/legal-aid-services (last
visited Apr. 4, 2014) (offering legal assistance to members and retirees of participating unions). As noted above, the more claims that are covered, the more
costly the benefit as more people are likely to use it. In addition, while there
are opportunities to recover legal fees from the defendant in many successful
employment cases, thus reducing the cost of representation, in other areas of
law, such as real estate and immigration, no fee recovery is available. On the
other hand the costs of representation will be quite low for some cases, such as
simple real estate transactions. This type of plan, however, is less likely to
serve the purpose of engaging employees in the broader union movement and
more likely to draw and retain only those who see the union as a competitive
service provider. Any type of legal services plan that requires practice in court
will require use of counsel authorized to practice in the jurisdiction, potentially increasing costs.
143. Depending on the state and its interpretation of unauthorized practice
of law, there may be limitations on the use of non-lawyers in arbitration as
well. See supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text.
144. See Advocacy: Forced Arbitration, NELA, https://www.nela.org/NELA/
index.cfm?event=showPage&pg=mandarbitration (last visited Apr. 4, 2014);
Fair Arbitration, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2512
(last visited Apr. 4, 2014). The Arbitration Fairness Act has been regularly introduced in Congress. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong.
(2013). It would eliminate compulsory arbitration imposed on employees and
consumers by businesses.
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earlier steps, the case may settle in those stages, reducing the
costs. Litigation, however, might take years, involving extensive pretrial discovery and appeals, as well as pretrial motions
with accompanying briefs.
To reduce the cost of the program (and also the benefit),
the union could limit claims to certain legal violations. For example, claims relating to unpaid wages under state and federal
law are likely to be difficult for employees to pursue in individual arbitration, where the cost might exceed the amount of the
145
recovery. These claims may be less complex to arbitrate than
discrimination claims, for example, and easier to standardize
146
once a few successful claims have been brought. Without potential for class actions, these claims may be far less attractive
147
to the plaintiffs’ bar. The union could provide a real service to
employees, tying into the theme of challenging employers who
try to take away employee rights using arbitration. The downside to this limitation is that it makes the benefit less attractive than one that covers a broader range of workplace disputes. Discrimination, wrongful terminations under state tort
and contract law, and violations of the Family Medical Leave
Act are common claims that also cry out for legal representation.
Another question is whether some judgment will be made
as to the prospects for success before the union undertakes representation. Including such a requirement is essential to pre145. See Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. Civ. 01-545(JRTFLN), 2002
WL 100391, at *6, rev’d, 346 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that given the
small size of each plaintiff’s overtime claim, many were likely to abandon
those claims without availability of a class action).
146. Recent research on a set of employment arbitrations before the American Arbitration Association demonstrated that discrimination claims were
more difficult to win in employer-promulgated procedures than other cases,
but led to higher damage awards in those cases won. Colvin & Pike, supra
note 52, at 28.
147. Other Court decisions have made it easier to defeat class and collective actions also. See, e.g., Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct.
1523 (2013) (finding employer’s offer of complete individual relief under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 68 mooted collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (applying high standard for commonality of claims warranting class action under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23); see also Christopher McKinney, Corporate Attorneys Planning Strategies
to “Pick Off” FLSA Collective Actions, TEX. EMP. L. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2013),
http://www.texasemploymentlawblog.com/2013/04/articles/trial-practice
-litigation-issu/corporate-attorneys-planning-strategies-to-pick-off-flsa
-collective-actions (describing business strategies for defeating FLSA collective
actions in light of Genesis Healthcare and pointing out that these cases could
become so difficult that plaintiffs’ lawyers will decline to accept them).
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serve resources for cases in which there is a viable claim. The
union must decide who will make the determination of viability
and what standard will be used. Further, the standards for the
determination must be clear to the members to avoid unhappiness and legal action when denials occur. Certainly the union
should be able to decline representation in cases where there is
no viable legal claim, and strong claims pose no real issue, but
there are many arguable claims where success is uncertain. At
a minimum, the decisions must involve assessment by a lawyer
and include an explanation to the member of the reasons for
the decision.
The more claims that are covered, the more valuable the
benefit is to the employees but the more costly the benefit is to
the union. Where the arbitration plan is so tilted against employees that success is unlikely, the union must decide whether
to decline representation or challenge the plan in court. Such
litigation will be expensive, but may offer the potential for recovery of legal fees and if successful will benefit all of the employees in the workplace. Further, as noted above, even a loss
in such cases can be fuel for the fire of both membership recruitment and arbitration reform. Nevertheless, without some
victories in arbitration the program is likely to be both unpopular and unsuccessful.
Another consideration is whether the union will cover all
costs of representation or impose some limits either in maxi148
mum monetary terms or in terms of services covered. For example, if the employee is responsible for part of the cost of the
arbitrator it should be clear whether the union pays that, as
well as other costs of litigation such as discovery. In addition,
the program must be clear on whether the union provides representation for appeals of unfavorable decisions. Given the lim149
ited grounds for appeal of arbitration, the union should certainly retain the right to decide not to fund an appeal unless
prospects for success are substantial. That limitation and the
reasons for it should be clear to members and used to bolster
the campaign to limit or reform compulsory arbitration. Deci148. Additionally, where the employer’s program offers the employee funds
to pay a lawyer, the program should require the employee to access those
funds and pay them to the attorney, defraying part of the cost of representation. See infra note 158.
149. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (2012); Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
576, 585–86 (2008) (finding FAA’s grounds for review exclusive).150.Of course,
depending on the scope of the plan or pilot program, existing members may
utilize the plan immediately.
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sions about the scope of representation must be carefully considered, as they will impact both the costs and benefits of the
plan.
3. Marketing and Rollout of the Plan
To some extent, the costs of the plan will depend on how
and to whom it is marketed. To avoid being overwhelmed with
150
more claims than the system can handle, the program could
initially be marketed or tested in a limited way, perhaps to employees in industries where the union already represents some
employees, or to those where at least some employees have
shown interest in union membership. Alternatively it could be
piloted in a particular geographic area where the union has
151
available local representatives who can handle the claims.
Limiting the geographic area facilitates compliance with bar
requirements regarding unauthorized practice of law and fee
sharing. Additionally, a slow roll-out will give the union the opportunity to test the program and work out any kinks before a
wholesale campaign.
4. Union Membership Dues
Unions already have set membership dues for existing and
prospective members. AFL-CIO unions have just voted to adopt
new forms of representation with new dues structures and/or
152
other financing mechanisms. As a benefit of membership,
representation could be covered by dues payments or subject to
an additional charge, calculated by the union. Depending on
the scope of the benefit, some dues increase or additional
charge may be necessary.
Since this benefit is designed as a tool to recruit new members who are not a part of a collective bargaining unit, a union
that does not currently have at-large or affiliate members will
need to determine whether to charge the same dues to those
members or a different amount based on the availability of
benefits and the cost of representation. Even those that cur150. Of course, depending on the scope of the plan or pilot program, existing members may utilize the plan immediately.
151. Recent research by Colvin & Pike demonstrated that arbitration cases
in California were more likely to be successful and to achieve a higher damage
award for the employee. Colvin & Pike, supra note 52, at 28–29. This may
suggest that California is a good place to begin the program although it also
indicates that Californians may not need the program as much as employees
in other states.
152. Amber, supra note 6.
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rently have such members may need to reconsider the dues
153
structure in light of this added benefit. Working America, the
AFL-CIO’s affiliate for members in units not represented for
collective bargaining, is currently considering a dues structure
based on services and benefits provided, which might provide
154
an opportunity to test this idea. A key factor in cost will be
the model of representation used, and it is to that factor that
the Article turns next.
B. PROVIDING REPRESENTATION
There are a variety of possible models for providing representation in legal disputes. Careful evaluation will be necessary to determine the best model for each union. This section is
not designed to provide a comprehensive analysis of all possible
issues, but to highlight some of the available models for consideration and suggest some of the benefits and concerns that
might arise with each.
Unions arbitrating collective bargaining disputes use varied representation models. Some regularly use attorneys for arbitration, either in-house lawyers or attorneys from law firms,
while others rarely use attorneys, preferring to utilize union
representatives in arbitration cases. Cost and complexity of the
case are certainly factors in making this determination. As for
the legal arbitrations contemplated, depending on the scope of
cases, some may require attorneys for effective representation
because of the legal complexity while others might easily be arbitrated by trained union representatives. In addition, questions of unauthorized practice of law must weigh heavily in this
155
determination. Whatever model is chosen, it should be clear
up front to the members who will represent them or, if the plan
uses both attorneys and union representatives, who will decide
which representatives handle which cases. The sections that
follow discuss the considerations in deciding which representational model to follow.

153. For example, the United Steelworkers currently have an associate
membership, which apparently is free and designed to facilitate communication, community, and political action and organizing. See About the Associate
Members Program, UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://www.usw.org/join_us/about
(last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
154. Amber, supra note 6.
155. See supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text.
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1. Attorneys
These are legal disputes and the immediate instinct is to
use lawyers to try them, regardless of forum. Lawyers are
trained to handle legal disputes. Their training and experience
enables them to see the nuances of cases that may be missed by
lay representatives. There are clear rules that apply to all at156
torneys and govern their representation of clients. The availability of malpractice insurance to guard against claims by dissatisfied clients is another benefit of using lawyers. Unions
typically have attorneys on staff and frequently also use outside counsel. Either could be utilized to handle legal claims of
members. Important considerations in deciding between them
are cost to the union, availability of attorneys authorized to arbitrate in the relevant jurisdictions, and the application of ethical rules regarding representation and legal fees.
a. In House Attorneys
Virtually every existing national union has a staff of attorneys that handles a variety of legal matters for the union. Some
local unions employ staff attorneys as well. It is well-settled
that the union can employ attorneys to assist members with le157
gal claims without running afoul of state bar requirements.
The union might use its own staff attorneys or set up a separate legal plan with attorneys employed specifically to aid
workers in their legal disputes with employers.
i.

Financial Considerations
158

A significant benefit of using staff attorneys is cost. Paying attorneys a salary is likely to be more cost-effective than
156. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013).
157. See, e.g., United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Assoc., 389
U.S. 217, 221–22 (1967); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29
(1963) (finding constitutional right to assist members and others with litigation using NAACP staff attorneys paid by the organization).
158. Some employers provide funds to employees to assist in obtaining legal representation. See Due Process Protocol, supra note 62; see also COOPER,
NOLAN, BALES, & BEFORT supra note 76, at 825 (quoting an employer’s counsel who suggests that employers should, if necessary, pay for the employee’s
lawyer because it makes the process easier for both parties and provides the
employee with both a realistic view of the prospects for success and advice
about the fairness of any settlement). The union’s program should make clear
that members are expected to take advantage of any funds provided by the
employer and use them to pay for representation. It is highly unlikely that
such fees will cover the entire cost of representation, but they will alleviate
some expense. Where such programs exist to convince employees to join the
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paying outside counsel to litigate. In today’s tight job market
for lawyers, hiring qualified attorneys interested in workers’
rights and willing to work for a union representing workers
with legal claims should not be difficult. However, hiring staff
does come with the added costs of the benefits the union provides and associated employment costs, such as workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance. Geographic considerations may also be relevant. It may be more cost-effective to use
outside counsel in locations requiring significant travel costs
for union staff lawyers. Additionally, the union must consider
whether the staff attorneys will be able to arbitrate in the relevant jurisdictions. Thus, the union must determine whether it
is more economical to hire attorneys or contract with outside
counsel, which will depend on many factors and might change
over time.
Even where the union’s attorney is salaried, if the legal
claim results in a remedial award of attorneys’ fees, those fees
can be awarded at market rates so long as they go into a litiga159
tion fund and not into the union’s general fund. To avoid ethical concerns about fee splitting arrangements with
nonlawyers, the fund should be controlled by attorneys and
160
used to support only legal actions, not other union functions.
union for the benefit of representation, the union must be prepared to show
the inadequacy of employer funds for obtaining effective representation. Additionally, using employer funds to pay union-provided attorneys raises the
question of whether payment of those funds to the union or the employee
would violate § 302 of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2012). Because the
payment is to the employee, and not to the union directly, it would seem to
implicate only § 302(3), which prohibits payment to employees to influence
other employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights. Id. § 186(a)(3). Since that is
not the purpose, § 302 should not bar the use of the fees to pay union lawyers,
so long as the fees go towards legal representation, and not the general treasury. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Raney v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 222 F.3d 927, 939 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Kean v. Stone, 966 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1992); Curran v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 805 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886, 901–02 (1984) (allowing full recovery of market rate fees to nonprofit
legal services organization, even though the attorney was salaried and had no
billing rate). There is, however, no guarantee that an arbitrator will award
fees using the same standards as a court would. And, indeed, some arbitration
programs limit remedies, including fees. See Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock,
110 F.3d 222, 225, 230–31 (3d Cir. 1997).
160. Raney, 222 F.3d at 936–37; Rodriguez v. City of New York, 721 F.
Supp. 2d 148, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). While some bars have eliminated the ban
on fee sharing with nonprofit organizations as have the ABA Model Rules,
other states retain limitations on fee sharing with nonlawyers. For examples
of rules that permit fee sharing with nonprofit organizations, see MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)(4) (2002); see also Va. Legal Ethics
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With these limited restrictions, however, attorneys’ fees awards
from successful cases can assist in funding representation for
other union members with legal claims.
ii. Ethical Issues Regarding Representation
The concern that animates the prohibition on fee sharing
also applies in general to the employment of attorneys by the
union, controlled by non-attorneys, to represent members. The
fear is that the attorney will be influenced by something other
than solely the needs of the client. In approving the use of union attorneys to represent members in United Mine Workers,
the Supreme Court characterized the possibility of conflicting
interests between the union and employees as “theoretically
imaginable,” but found it to be no justification for barring union
161
legal assistance to members. To insure protection of the interests of members and to avoid any issue with the bar, the
program should provide for complete independence on the part
of the lawyers making decisions regarding clients’ cases. It
should require attorney compliance with all ethical rules and in
particular, dedication to the interests of the union mem162
ber/client. Ideally, designated attorneys should handle the
members’ cases exclusively, while others handle the union’s legal business. Such separation will protect the interests of the
163
union, the members, and the attorneys. Using a separate leComm., Op. 1744 (2000), available at http://www.vacle.org/opinions/1744.htm;
Am. Bar Ass’n, Ala. Formal and Informal Ethics Op. RO-95-08 (1995), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/
Iris/clearinghouse/opinion2.authcheckdam.pdf. For examples of rules prohibiting fee sharing with nonprofit organizations, see R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory
Panel, Op. 2000-05 (2000) [hereinafter R.I. Ethics Op.], available at http://
www.courts.ri.gov/AttorneyResources/ethicsadvisorypanel/Opinions/2000-5
.pdf; Mass. Bar Assoc., Ethics Op. 97-6 (1997), available at https://www
.massbar.org/publications/ethics-opinions/1990-1999/1997/opinion-no-97-6;
Tex. Ctr. for Legal Ethics, Op. 503 (1994), available at http://www.legalethics
texas.com/Ethics-Resources/Opinions/Opinion-503.aspx.
161. 389 U.S. at 224.
162. The union lawyer’s ethical obligations are complex when representing
members in the negotiated grievance and arbitration procedure. See generally
Russell G. Pearce, The Union Lawyer’s Obligations to Bargaining Unit Members: A Case Study of the Interdependence of Legal Ethics and Substantive
Law, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1095 (1996) (discussing the complexities involved for
union lawyers who represent the union as an organization and union members
and potential members). Some of the challenges should be less difficult when
dealing with legal claims.
163. See generally, Pearce, supra note 162 (discussing the complexity of a
union lawyer’s ethical obligations).
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gal plan which employs the attorneys but is funded by the union might further emphasize the distinction.
b. Outsourcing Representation
An alternative method for providing the legal services to
members is to outsource the representation to private attorneys. Most unions use outside counsel for some legal services
and thus have relationships with private attorneys who specialize in labor and employment issues. Additionally, attorneys
who specialize in representing employees may be interested in
handling these cases if payment were more certain than in a
contingent case involving an individual employee in arbitra164
tion. The U.S. Supreme Court in Brotherhood of Railroad
165
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar held that union referral of
members to outside counsel for representation is permissible
and protected First Amendment activity.
i.

Costs, Fees, and Ethical Limitations

Use of outside counsel may be more expensive than hiring
staff attorneys. Outside counsel are typically compensated on
an hourly basis, although the union could negotiate favorable
rates, particularly in today’s legal market. Attorneys must
make sufficient income to support their practices, which explains the general lack of interest in many of these cases. Negotiation might produce a favorable fee agreement beneficial to
both the union and the attorneys, however. A creative arrangement might reduce the costs to the union to comparable
to or less than the cost of in-house lawyers.
As one example, a nonprofit group representing day laborers paid an attorney a $10,000 retainer to represent the day la166
borers in their workers’ compensation claims. The organization allowed the attorney to keep 10% of the recovery for each
claim and to pay back the organization with the first $10,000
167
collected through this process. The remainder of the fees be168
longed to the attorney. The bar approved the arrangement,
164. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that employees with
smaller claims often have trouble finding a lawyer to take their case because
the size of the potential recovery is so small).
165. 377 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964).
166. D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 329 (2005), available at http://www.dcbar.org/
legal-ethics/opinions/opinion329.cfm.
167. Id.
168. Id.

2014]

TRILOGY REDUX

1721

noting that because the payment to the nonprofit was not contingent on the amount of the recovery and because of the nonprofit’s purpose, there was little likelihood that the nonprofit
169
would interfere with the attorney’s professional judgment.
Additionally, allowing the practice would further the purpose of
making legal services more available to underserved popula170
In such an arrangement, the union can predict its
tions.
costs. However, it does not then benefit from all of the fees
awarded in successful cases where defendants pay fees.
Recovery of fees in excess of those paid out to the lawyer offers a way for the union to finance other litigation on behalf of
employees. In the case of staff attorneys, the ability to obtain
market rate fees offers that opportunity. With outside counsel,
such recovery is less likely unless the union can negotiate to
pay less than market rates and obtain a fee award of market
171
rates or more. Contentious litigation over the fee award will
raise the costs of the case. And fee awards shared with the union by outside counsel may raise more questions with the bar
than those by in-house attorneys.
The concern of the bar that differentiates outside counsel
referrals from in-house attorney cases is that cases might be referred to counsel who promise the greatest “referral fee” to the
172
referring organization. Many bars have recognized that these
concerns are not present when the referring organization is a
nonprofit with a goal of increasing access to legal representa-

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. The arbitrator would have to be convinced that the market rate exceeded the rate the attorney charged. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895
(1984) (“[courts] must avoid . . . decreasing reasonable fees because the attorneys conducted the litigation more as an act of pro bono publico than as an effort at securing a large monetary return.” (quoting Stanford Daily v. Zurcher,
64 F.R.D. 680, 681 (N.D. Cal., 1974)); Reiter v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit Auth. 457
F.3d 224, 232–33 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the magistrate judge had erred
in granting fees at negotiated discount rate instead of market rate); St. Louis
Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of St. Louis, 96 F.3d 323, 332 n.9 (8th Cir. 1996)
(stating that the fee agreed to may indicate what is reasonable and should be
considered, but it is not dispositive for determining fee award). In some cases
attorneys’ fees may include an adjustment either up or down based on factors
such as success in the case or, in rare cases, quality of representation. See 2
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 42-70 to 42-79 (Barbara T. Lindemann et
al. eds., 2012).
172. See R.I. Ethics Op., supra note 160 (noting that fee-splitting could
cause a lay-person to hire the lawyer who offers the best referral fee, rather
than the most competent lawyer).
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173

tion. Others, however, have applied the prohibition on fee
174
sharing even to nonprofits, some recognizing the inapplicability of the concern but feeling bound by the language of the
175
rule. The concern seems even less relevant if the union is only receiving compensation for fees paid to the lawyer. Further,
building on United Mine Workers and Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, the union may have a First Amendment argument
176
to challenge the bar requirements. Nevertheless, in creating
such a program unions must be aware that in some states recovery of legal fees may be impossible, at least without litigation.
To maximize the chances of fee recovery and to minimize
any ethical concerns, the union’s agreements with outside
counsel should ensure the independence of the lawyers in representing the employees. Additionally, any fees recovered by
the union should be segregated in a legal expense fund separate from the general treasury. Fee arrangements could be tailored to the requirements of the bar in the particular state. Attorneys may be reluctant to risk bar sanctions even if there are
constitutional or other arguments available to challenge the
bar. Alternatively, the union could seek a legal ethics opinion
from the bar specific to the circumstances of the program.
c. Legal Services Plan
An alternative that may alleviate some bar concerns is to
set up a legal services plan as a separate organization that employs or retains counsel. If the organization is operated by an
attorney or attorneys who control the decisions, concerns about
fee sharing or unauthorized practice of law will be mini177
mized. For a union with an existing legal services plan, inclu173. See, e.g., supra note 160 and accompanying text.
174. See id.
175. See R.I. Ethics Op., supra note 160, at 2–3.
176. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 906 (2012), available at http://
www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=4222 (citing Roy D. Simon,
Jr., Fee Sharing Between Lawyers and Public Interest Groups, 98 YALE L.J.
1069, 1126–32 (1989)).
177. See id. (indicating that decisions banning fee sharing do not address
the situation where the nonprofit is itself a law firm). As for unauthorized
practice of law, although some bars have raised concerns about attorneys
working for nonprofits run by non-lawyers, see Wayne Moore, Are Organizations That Provide Free Legal Services Engaged in the Unauthorized Practice
of Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2397, 2400 (1999). United Mine Workers seems
to have put those concerns at rest for unions. United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v.
Ill. State Bar Assoc., 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
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sion of the arbitration services in the plan will entail minimal
administrative cost. Setting up such a plan, however, will involve administrative costs which must be taken into account in
determining the best structure.
The union could create a legal services plan in partnership
with other organizations such as worker centers or existing le178
gal aid programs in the area. One advantage of creating a
separate organization is that, consistent with existing legal requirements, it might be established as an organization that
would entitle attorneys working for the organization to loan
forgiveness after ten years of employment in qualifying organi179
zations. Unions do not qualify, but a separate organization
funded in part by the union and created in partnership with existing service providers to low income populations, if carefully
180
structured, could meet the requirements. If so, the organization could attract young lawyers who would be willing to work
for lower pay because of the loan forgiveness attached to employment. A cheaper alternative to using lawyers, however,
would be to employ union representatives in arbitration.
2. Using Union Representatives
The use of union representatives in place of attorneys could
reduce the arbitration costs to the union even further. In many
unions, union representatives are trained to arbitrate cases
181
and regularly do so. In most cases, however, the claims are
182
contractual rather than legal, although there is occasional
overlap. Accordingly, additional training may be necessary to
enable union representatives without legal backgrounds to
178. Unions are already partnering with worker centers on various initiatives, and the AFL-CIO recently adopted a resolution, backed by organizational resources, to increase partnerships with community organizations dedicated
to social and economic justice, including worker centers. Resolution 16: Building Enduring Labor-Community Partnerships, AFL-CIO 2013 CONVENTION,
http://www.aflcio.org/About/Exec-Council/Conventions/2013/Resolutions-and
-Amendments/Resolution-16-Building-Enduring-Labor-Community
-Partnerships (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
179. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FED.
STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/
charts/public-service#what-kinds-of-employment (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
180. See id. (noting that employment with a public organization that provides public interest legal services may qualify for the loan forgiveness program).
181. See In re Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d 85, 90–91 (R.I. 2012) (discussing the use of union representatives in arbitration cases).
182. See id. at 93 (noting that the labor disputes often involve “the law of
the shop” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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handle these claims. And some cases may be too legally complex to be handled by a union representative. As noted above,
however, in some instances, once a few cases have been arbitrated, similar cases could easily be tried following the pat183
tern. For example, if many employees have been required to
work off the clock under similar circumstances, it would be relatively easy for a union representative to try such cases based
on a litigation pattern. The legal questions as to whether payment is due are relatively straightforward, and the cases will
184
turn mostly on the facts.
The most significant question about using union representatives is whether they would be engaged in the unauthor185
ized practice of law. There appears to be a significant risk in
many states that arbitrating legal claims might be deemed the
unauthorized practice of law, even if the employer’s arbitral
186
The union
system contemplates nonlegal representation.
must consider the risk of legal liability should it undertake
such a model. While the union might be able to insure against
duty of fair representation claims and perhaps other legal
claims of negligent representation if such representation is in
compliance with law, unauthorized law practice would most
likely negate any insurance.
A less risky model would use union representatives like
paralegals, engaging them in investigation and case preparation under the supervision of lawyers, in addition to involving
them in earlier steps in the ADR process. Their substantial experience in arbitration would fit them well for such tasks and
reduce the attorney time invested. If the union representatives
acted as paralegals, recovery of fees for their time might be
187
available if fees are awarded as a remedy. Because most em183. See supra Part II.A.3 (identifying the susceptibility of certain wage
and hour disputes to this kind of system).
184. The employee would need to prove that she worked overtime without
pay and show the amount of time worked, in addition to showing that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge that the employee was working
overtime. E.g., Davis v. Food Lion, 792 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986). Even
where there is some complex aspect to the litigation, such as the use of an expert in the Food Lion case to show that Food Lion’s system effectively required
off the clock work, id. at 1277, a lawyer could try the first individual case but
all subsequent cases should be able to be systematized.
185. See supra Part II.B.4.
186. See supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text.
187. Recovery for paralegal time is permissible if documentation is available to support the time expended and the tasks are appropriate for a paralegal
and not tasks that could be completed by a staff member without such qualifi-
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ployment statutes refer explicitly to remedial awards of attorneys’ fees, it is unclear whether recovery of fees for a nonlegal
representative acting in place of a lawyer would be available,
188
however.
3. Employee Self-Representation
Another alternative would be to train employees for selfrepresentation. This model could be used in cases with a multitude of similar claims that would otherwise be litigated as a
189
class. It would work most effectively in cases with relatively
simple legal issues. Self-representation avoids the problem of
190
unauthorized practice of law. It also empowers employees
and involves them directly in their own cases, which may decrease the chance that they see the union only as a service provider and increase the chance that they stay involved with the
191
union after the conclusion of the case. The cost to the union
should be lower, although it is possible that an attorney might
litigate simple cases in less time than it takes to train members
cations, for example, clerical work. See, e.g., Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 553 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the relevant inquiry for
determining hours worked by paralegals is “whether the work was sufficiently
complex to justify the efforts of a paralegal, as opposed to an employee at the
next rung lower on the pay-scale ladder” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that fees for paralegal services are recoverable and should be determined
in the same manner as those for lawyers).
188. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (“The
court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff
or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and
costs of the action.”); Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3) (2012)
(“The court in such an action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to
the plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee, reasonable expert witness fees,
and other costs of the action to be paid by the defendant.”); Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (2006) (“In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fee)
as part of the costs . . . .”); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205
(2006) (“In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to
this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs . . . .”).
189. This model may be especially useful given the limits imposed by the
Supreme Court on the use of class action litigation. See supra Part I.B.
190. See Unauthorized Practice of Law, S.C. BAR, http://www.scbar.org/
PublicServices/UnauthorizedPracticeofLaw.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (excepting self-representation from the general definition of unauthorized practice of law).
191. See supra Part II.B.I.
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to be self-advocates, particularly if there are a small number of
members involved.
One risk is that employees will see this as an abandonment
of the promise of representation, resulting in dissatisfaction
and perhaps even litigation. Thus it should be done only with
clear notice to members that this is possible in some cases or
with the agreement of the member(s) that it is an effective approach in the particular case.
4. Hybrid Model
Given all of the considerations outlined above, the best
model for representation is one that is flexible. A flexible model
enables the union to respond to the specific needs in the particular case by considering the members involved, the particular
jurisdiction’s limits on representation, the availability of representatives that meet the necessary criteria, and the costs and
potential fee recoveries. A hybrid entails administrative costs,
since a determination must be made as to what resources to allocate to each case. It necessitates standards for the determination that are clear to both the administrators and the members
who are entitled to representation. Clear standards minimize
the likelihood of member disappointment, which could undermine the value of the system, and also of legal liability for failure to represent or effectively represent as promised. Involvement of representative members in creating and administering
such standards would be ideal, although might be difficult in
larger organizations. Such a system would enable the most effective deployment of union resources and, one hopes, lead to
the best chances of success on the claims and incorporation of
members in an advocacy campaign to enhance workplace justice.
CONCLUSION
Erosion of worker’s rights is proceeding at an accelerating
pace. Unions, while declining in strength and influence, remain
the most powerful workers’ rights organizations in the United
States. Unions have an opportunity to both build their membership and advocate for greater protection for the legal rights
of workers by creating an arbitration advocacy program. While
elimination of unilaterally-imposed employer arbitration would
be ideal, it seems unlikely in the current climate. Given that,
union advocacy can challenge employer-created arbitration
programs by providing employee representation to balance em-
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ployer power and by mobilizing workers to combat such programs through public protest and legislative advocacy. While
there are challenges in establishing a cost-effective program,
creative union efforts can meet them, turning an employer tactic used to reduce enforcement of the law to their advantage.
Unions must seize every possible opportunity to improve the
lives of workers and rebuild a powerful and successful movement to balance corporate power.

